La Cour d’appel du Québec dans R. c. Lebrasseur, 2013 QCCA 1432 mentionne qu’il faut appliquer strictement l’exception fondée sur l’article 515(9.1) C.cr. qui exige une inscription au dossier de l’instance par le juge de paix voulant qu’il « ordonne la détention sous garde du prévenu en se fondant principalement sur toute condamnation antérieure ». En l’absence d’une telle inscription ou en cas d’inscription ambiguë, la discrétion accordée au juge de retenir un ratio 1,5:1 pour le crédit de la détention préalable au prononcé de la peine, si les circonstances le justifient, reste entière.
Voici les passages pertinents :
[34] À mon avis, les premiers mots de l’article 515(9.1) C.cr., « [m]algré le paragraphe (9) », et le reste du texte de cet article, nous obligent à conclure qu’il n’est pas suffisant « de consigner les raisons en conformité avec les dispositions de la partie XVIII ayant trait à la manière de recueillir les témoignages lors des enquêtes préliminaires »[7] pour écarter la discrétion autrement dévolue au juge qui impose la peine d’accorder un crédit augmenté « si les circonstances le justifient ».
[35] L’article 515(9.1) C.cr. impose l’obligation d’inscrire au dossier de l’instance le motif de détention sous garde du prévenu fondé principalement sur toute condamnation antérieure : en raison de l’effet qu’emporte la présence d’une telle inscription au dossier, il n’est pas difficile de comprendre ce pourquoi la rigueur est de mise. L’obligation faite au juge de paix qui préside une enquête sur mise en liberté d’inscrire ce motif au dossier (fondé principalement sur toute condamnation antérieure) l’oblige à en mesurer l’à‑propos.
[36] Je retiens que le texte de l’article 515(9.1) C.cr. est clair. Avant de pouvoir conclure que, par sa décision sur la mise en liberté, un premier juge a limité la discrétion judiciaire de celui ou de celle chargé d’imposer la peine, il faut trouver au dossier une mention explicite voulant qu’il ait ordonné la détention en se fondant principalement, et non accessoirement ou notamment, sur toute condamnation antérieure. À cet égard, tout doute ou toute ambigüité doit s’interpréter en faveur du maintien de la discrétion judiciaire.
[37] Dans plusieurs jugements rendus à ce jour par des tribunaux de première instance, comme l’illustrent les quelques exemples suivants, c’est ainsi que les articles 515(9.1) et 719(3.1) C.cr. ont été compris et appliqués.
[38] Dans R. c. Vittrekwa, le juge M. Cozens de la Cour territoriale de Whitehorse Yukon écrit :
34 Under s. 515(9.1), if the justice at a bail hearing orders that the offender be detained because of a previous criminal conviction, he must state the reason in writing in the record. In the absence of this written record, there is no ability to “read in” that the offender must have been detained because of his or her prior criminal conviction.[8]
[39] Dans R. c. M.C., le juge A. Tuck‑Jackson de la Cour de justice d’Ontario indique :
30 […] The combined effect of s. 719(3.1) and 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code is such that Mr. M.C. cannot pass through the gateway to enhanced credit unless I am first satisfied that the Justice of the Peace who presided at Mr. M.C.’s bail hearing did not conclude that Mr. M.C. be detained in custody primarily because of a previous conviction. In my view, the Crown bears the burden of demonstrating that the jurist did detain primarily on the basis of a previous conviction. If there is any ambiguity as to the basis of detention, that ambiguity must operate in favour of the defence.[9]
[40] Dans R. c. London, le juge P. Chen de la Cour provinciale de Colombie-Britannique écrit :
1 There are a few issues here. The first one is the application of s. 515(9.1), coupled with the application of s. 719. Specifically that is whether or not the detention order pronounced by Judge Rae on July 5th, 2010 was primarily because of Mr. London’s previous conviction, or his prior record. Now that I have had an opportunity to review both that subsection and Judge Rae’s decision, I do not interpret Judge Rae’s decision detaining Mr. London as a decision that was primarily because of the previous conviction. It was a factor, certainly, but Judge Rae certainly did not state in her decision that it was the primary factor, so I am not prepared to find that Mr. London is precluded from having access to ss. (3.1) of s. 719.[10]
[41] Dans R. c. Goforth le juge B.J. Tomkins de la Cour provinciale de Fort Qu’Appelle de la Saskatchewan s’exprime ainsi :
32 Section 515(9) states that if interim release is refused “primarily because of a previous conviction”, this fact is to be endorsed in writing on the record. No such endorsement was made in Mr. Goforth’s case but the Crown took the position that Mr. Goforth’s bail was denied primarily because of his record, that as such an endorsement ought to have been made and that I should, therefore, either consider him ineligible for enhanced remand credit or deny enhanced credit.
33 Counsel made submissions regarding the onus of requesting, requiring or ensuring such endorsement. I do not believe it is necessary for me to resolve that issue, however, because I am satisfied that Mr. Goforth was not denied bail “primarily” because of a previous conviction.
34 I have reviewed the recording of Mr. Goforth’s show cause hearing and of my decision to refuse him release. Bail was refused in his case for a combination of reasons which I stated to be the following:
* That his record and these allegations, if proven, showed a pattern of serious violence;
* That Mr. Goforth did not recognize and/or had not taken steps to address his inclination to violence;
* That Mr. Goforth offered no “real” release plan, proposing if released to return to substantially the same living arrangements and controls, or lack thereof;
* That Mr. Goforth faced allegations that he attempted to interfere with the administration of justice by encouraging the victim of the section 266 assaults not to lay charges against him.
35 It was clearly all of these circumstances which together influenced the decision to refuse release and it is also clear that Mr. Goforth’s prior record for violence was not the primary reason for the decision. As such, it was appropriate that no endorsement was made on the record pursuant to section 515(9.1) and Mr. Goforth is not ineligible for enhanced remand credit.[11]
[42] Enfin, dans R. c. Rhyno le juge A.W.D. Pickup de la Cour suprême de Nouvelle-Écosse, district d’Halifax, écrit :
36 The Crown submits that as a result of the Provincial Court judge denying bail primarily on the basis of prior convictions of the accused, any remand credit for Ms. Rhyno cannot exceed a 1:1 ratio.
37 According to R. v. M.C., 2011 ONCJ 593 (CanLII), 2011 ONCJ 593, the Crown bears the burden of demonstrating that the offender was detained primarily on the basis of a previous conviction. Any ambiguity as to the basis for the detention operates in favour of the offender. Further, where an accused is detained on the primary basis of a previous conviction, this must be indicated on the record: Criminal Code, s. 515(9.1). Failing that, it falls to the sentencing court to determine whether the detention was on the basis of a previous conviction, but the burden to establish this rests on the Crown.
[…]
41 In this case, there is no doubt that the previous convictions were a significant element going to the decision to detain. In both the case of Michelle Rhyno and Michael Rhyno, I am satisfied that the previous convictions were the main factor in the denial of bail at Provincial Court.
42 Having so found, I am satisfied that the Crown has met its burden of proving that Michael Rhyno and Michelle Rhyno were detained under s. 519(9.1) such that s. 719(3.1) would not apply as asserted by the Crown. Therefore, enhanced credit will not be considered for either party.[12]
[43] D’ailleurs, l’examen de cette même jurisprudence révèle plusieurs cas de mentions claires par des juges ordonnant la détention provisoire d’un accusé principalement en raison de ses antécédents judiciaires.
